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I. INTRODUCTION
The cable television business traces its roots to John Walson, an
appliance storeowner in mountainous eastern Pennsylvania, and his
creation of Community Antenna Television ("CATV").' In June of 1948,
seeking to provide broadcast channels from Philadelphia to improve
television set sales, Walson placed an antenna at the top of a mountain on
the outskirts of town to receive the broadcast signal and then delivered it
down to the residents of Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania. 2
By 1952, Walson's idea spread beyond Pennsylvania to seventy
CATV systems with approximately 14,000 subscribers. 3 That exponential
growth would continue as operators realized the value of bringing in distant
programming to a market as opposed to simply relaying the local stations.4
Eight hundred cable systems were in place by 1962, servicing 850,000
subscribers.5 By 1990, cable had reached nearly fifty-three million
subscribers nationwide. However, the phenomenal growth was also
"accompanied by rising prices for consumers, incurring growing concern
among policy makers."
The cable television market has been subject to significant
foundational changes in response to policy makers' concerns and
technological developments. Twenty years ago, the industry operated with
the benefit of local monopolies and competition coming only from
broadcast stations and the C-Band8 satellite market.9 In 1994, the satellite
broadcasting industry changed when DIRECTV (and later DISH Network)
entered cable's market space with the introduction of the direct broadcast
1. History of Cable Television, BROADBAND CABLE ASSOCIATION OF PENNSYLVANIA,
http://www.pcta.com/about/history.php (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
2. Id.
3. History of Cable Television, NATIONAL CABLE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS
ASSOCIATION, http://www.ncta.com/About/About/HistoryofCableTelevision.aspx (last
visited Oct. 13, 2011) [hereinafter NCTA].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. C-Band refers to microwave signals received by 6'-9' satellite dishes that are also
known as Television Receive-Only (TVRO).
9. See Gareth Marples, The History of Satellite TV - A Vision for the Future,
THEHISOTRYOF.NET (Sept. 9, 2008, 6:55 AM), http://www.thehistoryof.net/history-of-
satellite-tv.html.
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 200 2011-2012
Number 1] STATEWIDE CABLE FRANCHISING 201
satellite ("DBS") technology.' 0 Adoption of the technology was swift;
since that time, the two major direct broadcast satellite players in the
United States have grown to account for over thirty-three million
subscribers. 1 ' In 2005, the efforts of traditional phone companies to
introduce further competition began to get traction in various state
legislatures. As of 2011, AT&T and Verizon account for approximately 7.4
million video subscribersl2 and have been instrumental in the passing of
laws encouraging their establishment of cable franchises in twenty-five
states. 13 With approximately fifty-nine million subscribers, traditional cable
companies remain the dominant force in the marketplace.14 Yet even
without the effects of competition, changes are occurring within their
business model as a result of the legislation that passed in various forms. 15
This Note will explore the approaches taken by four states to invite
competition into the cable marketplace to encourage price reductions,
improve service offerings, and reduce the digital divide by increasing the
broadband service footprint. Part II describes the efforts of Congress, the
FCC, and the Supreme Court to create and apply the law to the nascent
cable industry. Part III discusses the differences in approaches taken by
selected states. Part IV outlines the most significant areas to account for
when considering cable franchise reform and analysis of the pros and cons
of the different approaches to the various areas of concern. Finally, Part V
argues that the data available at this point suggests that those states that
adopted laws in coordination with their industry partners are seeing
10. Company Profile, DIRECTV, http://www.directv.com/DTVAPP/global/content
Page.jsp?assetld=1400012 (last visited Nov. 30, 2011).
11. This figure was calculated by adding the subscriber count provided by the DISH
Network Investor Relations Summary showing 14 million U.S. subscribers as of September
30, 2011 with DIRECTV's corporate overview, showing 19.76 million subscribers as of
June 30, 2011. DISH NETWORK CORP, Investor Relations, http://dish.client.shareholder.com/
(last visited Nov. 13, 2011); DIRECTV, Corporate Profile, http://investor.directv.com/
overview.cfm (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
12. This figure was calculated by the addition of the subscriber count provided by the
Verizon 3Q 2011 Highlights sheet, showing 4.0 million subscribers as of September 30,
2011, with AT&T's U-verse At A Glance count, showing 3.4 million subscribers as of June
30, 2011. Verizon Generates Strong Wireless Results, Increased Cash Flow, and FiOS and
Strategic Services Growth in 3Q, VERIZON (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www22.verizon.
com/investor/news verizon generates strongwirelessresults increasedcash_flowand f
iosand strategic servicesgrowth.htm; AT&T U-verse At A Glance, AT&T, http://www
.att.com/Common/about us/pdf/mediakit/u-verse/uverse 2q_infographic .pdf.
13. DIGITAL POLICY INST., BALL STATE UNIV., TELECOMMUNICATION DEREGULATION: A
POLICY PROGRESS REPORT, I (March 2010), available at https://cms.bsu.edu/Academics/
Centersandlnstitutes/-/media/DepartmentalContent/DPI/PDFs/TelecommDeregulation.ashx.
14. NATIONAL CABLE & TELECOMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATION, Industry Data,
http://www.ncta.com/Statistics.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
15. NCTA, supra note 3.
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promising results. The positive results also suggest, that for most states,
there are minor revisions to existing law that may improve the overall
service to the public, but major overhauls or reversals of policy do not
appear to be necessary. This Note concludes with a prescription
recommended for use by any state considering cable franchise reform.
1I. NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION REGULATORY BACKGROUND
A. Communications Act of 1934
With the advent of cable television still more than a decade away, the
1934 Communications Act did not lay out provisions setting out the
regulation of its operations.16 Instead, the Act laid out provisions governing
the burgeoning telephone and radio networks.' 7 The legislation addressed
telephony with "common carrier" provisions in Title II of the Act and radio
with radio transmission regulations in Title III. During cable's formative
years, the FCC recognized the limits of Title II and Title III, thus taking a
hands-off approach to the new technology.19 However, with the rapid
expansion of cable systems, the FCC began to assert its implied authority to
protect the public interest in having local broadcasters when CATV
proposed retransmitting distant programming into underserved rural
areas. Cable providers proposed using the existing antenna technology to
collect broadcast signals and then using microwave transmission equipment
to make them available far beyond the geographic footprint that would
have been possible using existing broadcast methods.21 For example, this
proposed innovation could have allowed a Chicago television station to be
retransmitted to cable subscribers in rural Iowa at the expense of the local
stations of Iowa City or Cedar Rapids.
B. Carter Mountain Transmission Corporation v. FCC
The issue came to a head in Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v.
FCC in 1963.22 Carter Mountain sought a license from the FCC to
16. The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064, has since been amended
to become the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 104 P.L 104 (codified as amended in
various at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2000)). The original version may be found at
Communications Act of 1934, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, http://www.dotcr.ost.dot
.gov/documents/ycr/communicationsact.pdf.
17. Id. at tit. I, § 1.
18. Id. at tit. II-III.
19. See NCTA, supra note 3.
20. See id.
21. See e.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
22. Id.
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retransmit via microwave transmitter stations from out of state into
Riverton, Lander, and Thermopolis, Wyoming.23 The licensee of television
station KWRB-TV, in Riverton, filed a protest.24 The FCC determined that
it "would not serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity to grant"
Carter Mountain's request.25 The FCC reasoned that permitting Carter
Mountain to bring in outside programs for the CATV systems on the basis
proposed "would result in the 'demise' of the local television station
(intervenor KWRB-TV) and the loss of service to a substantial rural
population not served by the community antenna systems, and to many
other persons who did not choose (or were unable) to pay the cost of
subscribing to [CATV] systems."26 The FCC decided this on the basis that
"the need for the local outlet outweighed the improved service which
appellant's proposed new facilities would bring to those who subscribed to
the community antenna systems." 27 The FCC did, however, suggest in its
ruling that it may have decided differently had the applicant showed that
the CATV system would carry the local station without duplicating its
network programming.28
Rather than adjust the application as suggested, Carter Mountain
appealed the ruling of the FCC on several grounds, including that the FCC
was acting outside of its authority in regulating cable systems.29 The court
upheld the FCC decision by suggesting that the ruling by the FCC was not
regulating the CATV system; instead the court found the FCC was
protecting the public interest in having local broadcasters, and by noting
that the FCC does have the power to indirectly affect CATV systems in
furtherance of that legitimate goal.30 Hence, the era of FCC involvement in
cable systems began.
C. United States v. Southwestern Cable Company
Newly empowered by the Carter Mountain decision and concerned
about the explosive growth of cable television systems nationwide, the
FCC began putting rules in place to regulate CATV systems. Most
significantly, the FCC developed "must-carry" regulations to protect local
broadcasters via formal regulatory provisions, unlike the method used in
23. Id at 361.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 362.
30. Id. at 365-66.
203
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Carter Mountain where the suggestion was made to the denied applicant to
carry the local station.3 1 These rules specifically outlined that "CATV
systems were required to transmit to their subscribers the signals of any
station into whose service area they have brought competing signals" and
that "CATV systems were forbidden to duplicate the programming of such
local stations for periods of 15 days before and after a local broadcast." 32
In 1966, Southwestern Cable was expanding its CATV offerings
south from Los Angeles into the San Diego marketplace. 33 Upon reaching
the viewing area of San Diego, local broadcaster KFMB-TV, through its
owner and licensee, Midwest Television, filed a protest with the FCC due
to the carriage by Southwestern Cable of Los Angeles network stations.34
Midwest Television alleged that this violated both the must-carry provision
and the prohibition against the carriage of the same network content from
outside the market in direct competition with the local broadcast station.3 5
The FCC agreed, ruling that Southwestern Cable must cease further
expansion during the consideration of the merits of Midwest Television's
allegations.36 Southwestern Cable appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which held that the FCC lacked authority for such an order under
the Communications Act of 1934. 37 The FCC appealed to the Supreme
Court and was granted certiorari. 38
The Court, in Justice Harlan's unanimous opinion, overturned the
Ninth Circuit by upholding the FCC ruling.39 While the Court declined to
issue a blank check regarding FCC authority of the cable television
industry, it did set out that the FCC could regulate that which was
"reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's
various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting.'4 0 The
FCC "may, for these purposes, issue 'such rules and regulations and
prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent with law,' as
'public convenience, interest, or necessity requires."'4
Armed with the endorsement of the Supreme Court, the FCC
continued its regulatory role in the development of cable television in the
31. See United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 166 (1968).
32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 159-60.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 160.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 161.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 178.
41. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(r)).
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absence of congressional action. The FCC set forth a program of dual
responsibility between itself and the local authorities. The FCC "retained
exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects of cable communication,
including signal carriage and technical standards."42 State and local
communities were given the "responsibility for granting franchises to cable
operators within their communities and for overseeing such local incidents
of cable operations as delineating franchise areas, regulating the
construction of cable facilities, and maintaining rights of way."4 3
D. Cable Communications Act of 1984
When the City of Miami, Florida put the city's cable franchise agreement
out to bid for renewal in 1984, it included an unusual provision in excess of
the five percent franchise fee: $200,000 to help finance a local drug
enforcement program.44 However noble and useful the cause may have
been, on appeal the FCC held that cable operators should not pay more than
five percent of their gross revenues and that payments for items unrelated
to the cable franchise were not permitted. In light of such extreme
concessions required by municipalities in the renewal process, in addition
to the lack of clear congressional direction, Senator Barry Goldwater
sponsored 4 6 what would become the Cable Communications Act of 1984
("1984 Cable Act").
The 1984 Cable Act's declared purpose was the following:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable communications; (2)
establish franchise procedures and standards . . . ; (3) establish
guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local authority with
respect to the regulation of cable systems; (4) assure that cable . . .
provide[s] . . . the widest possible diversity of information . . . ; (5)
establish an orderIy process for franchise renewal ... ; and (6) promote
competition ... .4
These aims were accomplished primarily by adding language to expand the
work of the 1934 Communications Act to include cable service as a
specific regulated industry under the FCC, the addition of sections
outlining franchise renewal, maximum franchise fees, and the public,
42. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 702 (1984).
43. Id.
44. See City of Miami, Florida, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1, 5 (1984) [hereinafter City of Miami].
45. Id. at 15-16.
46. Public Access TV, Regulation and Franchising, http://www.publicaccesstv.
net/history05.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
47. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, sec. 601, 98 Stat.
2779, 2780 (1984) (codified as 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
205
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educational, and governmental (PEG) channels.48 The Act codified the
existing FCC rules regarding franchisinh, including the maximum franchise
fee of five percent of gross revenue. The legislation also contained a
specific prohibition of common carriers competing in the cable business
within the same geographic footprint as their telephone service area unless
no alternative service was available.50
E. Telecommunications Act of 1996
The mid-1990s witnessed significant technological innovation within
the telecommunications marketplace. This, coupled with the maturation of
the cable business, produced a seismic shift that Congress responded to
with the 1996 Telecommunications Act ("1996 TelCom Act"). Among
other changes, the Act removed restrictions on competition in the cable
television market.5 1 This removal of restrictions effectively leveled the
playing field, since the introduction of phone service by the cable
companies and the arrival of the direct broadcast satellite companies into
the cable market had already occurred.
III. STATEWIDE CABLE FRANCHISING LEGISLATION
With the passage of the 1996 TelCom Act, the last of the federal
regulations barring phone companies from seeking entry to the cable
television market were removed. Still, telephone companies faced the
daunting task of negotiating with each local franchise granting authority to
compete. The piecemeal approach would be both time-consuming and
costly. Verizon suggested that it would "be able to offer competitive video
service to consumers much faster if [it could] get a statewide franchise
instead of knocking on every city's door, [because] a franchise can take
anywhere between six to 18 months to negotiate. The network itself only
takes about 18 months to build."52 Faced with this reality, Verizon and
AT&T pursued changes to the laws-first at the federal level, and then at
the state level-to ease the economic and time barriers to entry. Even as the
first state legislation was pending in Texas, Verizon clearly stated that it
was actively pursuing congressional action to ease the "labor-intensive
48. Id. at §§ 601(5), 611, 613(c).
49. Id. at § 622(b).
50. Id. at § 613(b)(1)-(2).
51. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-104, tit. 3, 110 Stat. 118, 118 (1996)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 543 note § 302(a) (1996)).
52. Marguerite Reardon, Telcos, Cable Companies Face off Over TV Franchises,
CNET NEWS, (May 27, 2005, 1:34 PM), http://news.cnet.com/Telcos,-cable-companies-
face-off-over-TV-franchises/2100-1034_3-5723368.html?tag-mncol (quoting Bill Kula).
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city-by-city approach" to franchising. 53 During that period, the companies
began the arduous process of applying to individual franchise authorities
with success in locations such as Ft. Wayne, Indiana54 and Keller, Texas.
In early 2006, Verizon estimated it had close to three hundred individual
franchise applications pending with only a "handful" of successes over that
two-year period.56 Faced with the failure to secure congressional action and
the reality of the negotiation process, the telephone companies began to
focus on state legislatures for solutions.
A. State of Texas - September 2005
In September of 2005, Texas became the first state to enact legislation
to permit statewide cable franchises. 57 The bill underwent substantial
changes to overcome the stiff opposition of the cable industry and the
Texas Municipal League ("TML").5 8 The original version, which passed
the Texas House of Representatives but not the Senate, did not include
provisions ensuring service to all residents in a franchise area, provisions
protecting local government authority of rights of way and other terms
common in cable franchise agreements. 59 After changes to bring the
legislation more in line with the existing franchise agreements in Texas,
Governor Rick Perry called an emergency session of the legislature during
which the bill was passed and signed into law by Perry.60
The law transferred franchisinq authority from local authorities to the
Texas Public Utilities Commission. The legislation balanced the franchise
53. Id.
54. Michael Summers, Big Cable vs. Big Telephone, FORT WAYNE READER, (March 6,
2006), available at http://www.fortwaynereader.com/story.php?uid=669.
55. Battling for the Eyes of Texas: Verizon's TV Service Is Winning Fans in a Forth
Worth Suburb. Will it Sell Nationwide?, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, March 20, 2006,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_12/b3976057.htm.
56. Id.
57. DIGITAL POLICY INST., BALL STATE UNIVERSTY, supra note 13, at 7; see also KAYE
HUSBANDS FEALING ET AL., HUBERT H. HUMPHREY INST. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, UNIV. OF MINN.,
STATEWIDE VIDEO FRANCHISING LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OUTCOMES IN
TEXAS, CALIFORNIA, AND MICHIGAN 6 (March 2009) [hereinafter COMPARATIVE STUDY].
58. The Texas Municipal League is the major association of cities in the State of Texas
with more than 1,115 cities counted among the membership. About the Texas Municipal
League, TEXAS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, http://www.tml.org/about.asp (last visited Nov. 13,
2011); Marguerite Reardon, Texas TV Franchise Bill Not Dead, CNET NEWS, (July 15,
2005, 12:33 PM), http://news.cnet.com/texas-tv-franchise-bill-not-dead/2100-1033_3-
5790370.htm.
59. See Reardon, Telcos, Cable Companies Face off Over TV Franchises, supra note
52.
60. See Reardon, Texas TVFranchise Bill Not Dead, supra note 58.
61. 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 58, available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/792/
billtext/pdf/SB00005F.pdf#navpanes=0.
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agreements in force at the time of enactment against the interests of
encouraging rapid introduction of competition by prohibiting the transfer of
in-force agreements to the statewide franchise scheme until their
contractual expiration.62 Additional concessions to the cable industry and
TML included a mandatory franchise fee of five percent of gross revenue
and a PEG channel fee equal to one percent of gross revenue. 63 The law
also called for new entrants into the cable business to match the carriage of
any existing PEG channels carried by the incumbent, and if none existed
until that point, the new entrant would be required to offer space for up to
three PEG channels.6
Despite the provisions above designed to even the playing field,
Verizon and AT&T did secure favorable terms compared to their
incumbent cable competitors as to build-out requirements and their
prospective service area footprints. While the incumbent cable operator set
up its network based on the requirement that it serve all households within
a given franchise authority's service area footprint, the Texas Legislature
relaxed this requirement for the phone company competitors. As a
deterrent to the practice of redlining,66 which may have been encouraged
by the lack of full build-out requirements, the legislation includes an
antidiscrimination clause which sets out that an operator "may not deny
access to service to any group of potential residential subscribers because
of the income of the residents in the local area in which such group
resides." 67 The passage of Senate Bill 5 in Texas was under close scrutiny
by lawmakers around the country, including those in California and New
Jersey who were on the verge of their own transition to the statewide cable
model. 68
B. State of New Jersey - August 2006
With the Texas law in place, eight states passed statewide franchise
laws in 2006 alone.69 New Jersey closely followed the developments in
Texas and had legislation introduced as early as November 2005.70 Unlike
62. Id. at 62.
63. Id. at 64.
64. Id. at 68.
65. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 57, at 3.
66. Id. ("Redlining is the practice of firms delineating certain areas in a city where they
will not provide a service based predominantly on the demographics of the region").
67. 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 76, available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/792/
bilitext/pdflSB00005F.pdf#navpanes=O.
68. Reardon, Texas TVFranchise Bill Not Dead, supra note 58.
69. DIGITAL POLICY INST., BALL STATE UNIVERSITY, supra note 13, at 7.
70. Linda A. Rushnak, Note, Cable Television Franchise Agreements: Is Local, State or
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Texas, where both Verizon and AT&T had a significant interest, the New
Jersey legislature was largely negotiating with Verizon alone. Despite this
exclusivity, the bill that became law called for an aggressive build-out
schedule to be implemented within six years of the issuance of a statewide
franchise. 7 1 It included the installation of fiber-optic cables to each home
within the 526 towns served by Verizon at the time of the bill.72 A build-
out of the network at this level was certain to remove any redlining
concerns, as under this scenario every home would be served where
Verizon was doing business. 73
Not content with making its mark with the build-out requirement,
New Jersey also introduced a unique franchise fee system. The bill not only
increased the fee from two percent to three percent for all cities with prior
franchise agreements, but also clarified the calculation of gross revenue as
including "basic, expanded basic, and premiere tier programming, for pay-
per-view events, seasonal or sportin events of limited duration, and for all
similar programming or channels." Additionally, the law provided for
one-half of one percent to go to the county in which the franchise city
resides, as well as setting aside another one-half of one percent to provide
basic tier service to residents enrolled in the "Pharmaceutical Assistance to
the Aged and Disabled" program.75 The law also required the franchisee to
provide each municipality with two PEGs and free equipment for use by
those PEGs, to allow each municipality to retain their rights-of-way
management, and to supply free Internet access and cable to municipal
buildings.7 6
C. State of California - September 2006
With the ink barely dry on the New Jersey law, California began to
finalize its own version of the statewide franchise law. The California
approach is unique in two regards: first, the legislation specifically targets
the expansion of broadband service for closure of the digital divide as a
goal of the bill, and second, the build-out provisions account for the
difference in the technologies utilized by the two main competitors.77
Presumably, the competition to be inspired by the law as a whole and the
build-out requirements would have the net effect of closing the digital
Federal Regulation Preferable?, 33 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 41, 59 (2006).
71. Id. at 60.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 60, 63.
74. A. B. 4430, 211th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 30(a) (N.J. 2005).
75. Id.
76. Rushnak, supra note 70, at 63-64.
77. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 57, at 4-6.
209
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divide. The different types of technology that underpin the Verizon (fiber-
optic) and AT&T (copper wire) systems are formally recognized in the
law.
AT&T utilizes the same copper wire technology that its telephone
network and digital subscriber line ("DSL") Internet service operate on to
provide video service over an internet protocol transfer.79 This system
involves little to no additional hardware and allows for two-way
communication (interactive television) in much the same way the Internet
works. Conversely, Verizon chose to run fiber-optic cable to each home,
greatly expanding the bandwidth from traditional copper wire, but at
considerable additional expense. This difference may have long-term
implications in the capabilities of the two carriers, as demands on the
broadband infrastructure continue to grow.
In California this distinction, for the time being, means that AT&T
must reach thirty-five percent of homes within three years and fifty percent
within five years.82 Verizon must reach twenty-five percent of homes
within two years and forty percent within five years. 83 To prevent potential
redlining, both carriers must include no less than twenty-five percent low-
income strata84 homes in their subscriber totals.8 5
D. State of Florida - May 2007
Florida headlines the nine additional states that passed statewide
franchise laws in 2007, bringing the total to eighteen nationally.86 The
Florida law contained three significant features: (1) existing local
franchises were voidable by the cable operator upon receipt of a statewide
license, (2) the statewide license included no franchise fee, and (3) the
ongoing regulation of the new statutory regime was not assigned to a single
administrative unit of the government (such as a public utility
commission). With few exceptions, cable operators applied for statewide
licenses and terminated local agreements, leaving local governments with a
78. Id. at 4-7.
79. See id. at 7.
80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. at 4-5.
84. "$35,000 or less per annum household income" is considered low income. Id. at 5.
85. Id.
86. DIGITAL POLICY INST., BALL STATE UNIV., supra note 13, at 7.
87. See OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS AND GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, AN
OFFICE OF THE FLA. LEGISLATURE, REPORT No. 09-35, BENEFITS FROM STATEWIDE CABLE
AND VIDEO FRANCHISE REFORM REMAIN UNCERTAIN 3 (Oct. 2009).
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revenue shortfall. The Florida franchise fee calls for a one-time $10,000
application fee, a $1,000 renewal fee every five years, and an annual $35
fee for information updates to be paid to the state general fund.
The state takes a piecemeal approach to regulatory oversight in
applying the new licensure system. Rather than charging a single agency
with all aspects of oversight, governmental oversight responsibility is
dependent on the subject matter. For instance, the Department of State
handles the applications, renewals, payments of fees, and issuance of
acceptance.90 The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services
handles consumer complaints about quality of service.91 The Department of
Legal Affairs, as defender of the state's unfair and deceptive trade practices
law, handles the investigation of complaints regarding race or income
discrimination in the provision of cable service.92 As expected, this system
has led to complaints by local officials about the inability to handle service
problems directly given the lack of leverage a franchise agreement
provided under the prior system.93 Concerns have also been raised about
the quality and availability of state agency service when addressing
complaints.94
IV. ANALYSIS OF CONSEQUENCES
There are several issues worth exploring that arise out of changes to
the cable franchise system: (A) franchise fees, (B) PEGs, (C) public rights-
of-way management, (D) regulatory oversight, (E) redlining and build-out
provisions, and (F) pricing and broadband access.
A. Franchise Fees
Traditionally, the cable operator pays a franchise fee to a municipality
as part of a cable franchise agreement. Federal law specifically limits any
franchise fee agreement to an amount not to exceed five percent of gross
revenues of the cable operator. 95 This limitation was included in the 1984
Cable Act to prevent unscrupulous municipalities from holding a cable
operator hostage for more exorbitant concessions, such as the attempt by
the City of Miami to secure funds for a drug enforcement unit through a
88. Id. at 6-7.
89. Id. at 3.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 6.
94. See id.
95. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2006).
211
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 211 2011-2012
212 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA WJOURNAL [Vol.64
cable franchise renewal.96 In practice, this fee serves as an additional tax on
the citizens of the municipality who choose to purchase cable because it is
passed directly back to the general fund for uses that may-or more likely
may not-be used for any telecommunications purpose. This fee may be
used to support the PEG channels or, in some cases, the operational costs of
these channels may be negotiated separately (discussed in depth below).
Statewide franchise laws have taken different forms as to franchise
fee provisions. In many jurisdictions such as Michigan, Texas, Virginia,
California, and Iowa, the law simply allows the franchise fee for a state
licensee to match the incumbent in any municipality in which it
competes.9 7 This should effectively make a resident's change of cable
provider revenue neutral to the municipality, notwithstanding any potential
reduction in fee due to a lower price in the competitive environment.
However, the definition of "gross revenues" is subject to considerable
interpretative license, a problem that has only been complicated by the
introduction of additional services, packages, and tiers. In some cases, a
statewide franchise may permit a municipality to collect five percent, but of
a lower base number due to a more narrow definition of "gross revenues."
For instance, that definition might only include basic cable service rather
than digital or premium packages. The entry of new competitors only
exacerbates the difficulty of standardizing the accounting for franchise
fees. It is in this area that some progress has been made through the
statewide franchising legislative process. In Texas, for example, the
franchise fee was set to five percent of gross revenue, where gross revenue
was defined as "all fees charged to subscribers for any and all cable service
or video service . . . ."98 This marks an increase in fee percentage for most
Texas municipalities, as well as an increase in the underlying revenue to
which that percentage is applied. As such, it seems that where a franchise
fee is included in any statewide franchise legislation, municipality revenues
are at least static, if not enhanced through the process. All of this assumes
that additional service providers will only split, rather than enhance, the
existing cable subscriber base. If enhanced, the expanded subscriber base
would also serve to increase revenues to the franchise authority.
Other states, such as Florida, did away with traditional franchise fees
altogether in the statewide application process; instead, the applicant only
pays the application fee and renewal to the state.99 Such a regime
96. See City of Miami, supra note 44.
97. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 57, at 6.
98. TEx. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 66.002(6)(A)(i) (West 2005).
99. See FLORIDA OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY,
supra note 87, at 3.
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presumably only encourages cable operators to move at the earliest
possible time to the statewide licensure system to remove the franchise fee
from their operational expenses.
One can surmise that the states allowing the five percent model to
persist were faced with the political compromise imposed by more
organized and potent organizations representing municipalities in the cable
franchise business, specifically, those with political influence and
something to lose. It is arguably better to use the Florida model-where
any revenue needed to offset the costs of managing the cable operators
should be borne via the traditional tax regime-rather than via a franchise
fee for transparency and true needs-based taxation.
B. Public, Educational, and Governmental Access Channels
(PEGs)
The 1984 Cable Act codified the right of franchise authorities to
require carriage of channels for governmental access, public access, and
educational purposes.' 00 Many franchise agreements required the cable
operator to provide equipment, facilities, and in some cases staff, to
produce material for airing. While it is not clear what viewership these
channels receivelol or what social value may be gained from them, it is
clear that vocal opposition does exist in pockets of the country to the
elimination or reduction in accessibility of PEG channels.102
The statewide franchise legislation has varied as to the handling of the
PEGs. Some jurisdictions, such as New Jersey, have been particularly
friendly to the PEG cause by mandating two PEG channels in each of the
traditional cable franchise municipalities in addition to the licensee-
provided equipment and training that would allow for the creation of
content.103 Many states, such as Virginia, California, and Michigan,
adopted a hybrid that includes provisions requiring a statewide licensee to
match the incumbent operator's PEG carriage, with specified limits on the
number of channels and fee structure.104 Other states, such as Texas and
100. See FCC, CABLE TELEVISION FACT SHEET: CABLE TELEVISION INFORMATION
BULLETIN (June 2000), http://transition.fcc.gov/mb/facts/csgen.html (last visited Nov. 13,
2011) [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
101. Theodore Bolema, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY, AN EVALUATION OF
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR HIGHER CABLE FEES TO FINANCE PUBLIC, EDUCATION AND
GOVERNMENT ACCESS CHANNELS 8 (Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.mackinac.org/archives/
2008/2008-1 IREGfeesWEB.pdf.
102. See, e.g., Tracy Rosenberg, Why Public Access Television is Important and You
Should Fight for the CAP ACT, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2010, 4:40 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tracy-rosenberg/why-public-access-.televis_b_457414.html.
103. 2006 N.J. Laws C.48:5A-3(k), (1).
104. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 57, at 6.
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Iowa, also maintained the incumbent PEG fee percentage, and used
municipality population to determine the number of PEG channels
required, with two or three channels in most cases.10 5 Finally, Florida
maintained the access right, but did away with PEG fees in the course of
eliminating franchise fees. 106
While the number of channels has been protected in many cases, the
introduction of statewide competition has lessened the degree to which
these channels are obvious to the channel surfer. AT&T engages in what is
called "channel slamming"l07 by placing all of the PEG channels into a
submenu rather than providing individual spots on the "dial" that you might
stumble upon while channel surfing. os Proponents of the PEG channels
argue that this erodes a major source of their audience, since few turn the
television on for the purpose of watching PEG programming, but may
watch once they happen upon it.109
An additional concern may arise where legislation is not clear as to
mandatory carriage provisions of PEG channels. If the incumbent cable
operators are forced to carry and contribute to the operation of these PEG
channels, while the law does not require the statewide licensees to do the
same, unfair competition results where only one of the two competitors is
saddled with the added expense of the PEG program.
As with the franchise fee, the balance of interests is likely best struck
by using the Florida legislation as a model. It ensures the PEGs access
through must-carry provisions, while shifting the cost to maintain them
from the indirect PEG fee built into consumers' cable bills to a direct
funding mechanism by any municipality that determines their value to the
community sufficient to warrant direct tax payer support. While this model
may result in closure of some less competitive PEG channels, those
communities that value the service will be able to preserve it by virtue of
the grant of mandatory carriage by all cable operators.
105. Id.
106. See FLORIDA OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY,
supra note 87, at 6-7.
107. See Katie Saxon, PEG Communities Concerned Over Channel Slamming,
WADSWORTH POST (Dec. 7, 2010), available at http://thepostnewspapers.comlwadsworth
/cable-tv-commission-wadsworth- 12-12--saxon-.
108. City Hands Bright House Bill for Cable Franchise Fees, INDIANAPOLIS Bus. J., July
27, 2009, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/government/govemment-bodies-offices-
regional/13142357-1 .html.
109. See Rosenberg, supra note 102.
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C. Public Rights-of- Way Management
Local government maintains primary responsibility over the public
rights-of-way to ensure the orderly and efficient use of them.110 "Local
governments have a duty and an oblifation to bear the cost of acquiring and
maintaining public right-of-way,"11 and subsequently "require fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers on a
competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis"ll 2 for their use. How a
municipality issues construction permits is the most frequent display of this
regulatory power over the limited public space. These rights-of-way can
take the form of telephone poles, underground utility conduits, or the
development of systems on previously undeveloped land. There is no
current example of a statewide franchise law passing with language that
encroaches in a significant way on this local power and the permitting
revenue stream that accompanies it.
D. Regulatory Oversight
The 1992 Cable Act required the FCC to issue minimum customer
service guidelines for cable operators." 3 The guidelines are not binding but
rather serve as a starting point for individual franchising authorities (either
state or local) to establish rules governing the cable operator.1 The
guidelines specifically lay out customer service items: maximum hold
times for customers using phone customer service; maximum time delay in
reestablishing service after a disruption; maximum service hour window;
and notice requirements for changes in rates, channel lineups, or fees.1
Prior to the statewide cable franchise reforms, it was relatively
straightforward to determine the regulatory body responsible for handling
complaints. Regardless of whether the issue arose out of a consumer
complaint, disputes as to payment of franchise fees, or issues regarding
PEG channel delivery, the franchise authority had the leverage of having
been one-half of the contractual relationship when calling for fulfillment of
aspects of the agreement. Additionally, a poor service record or fee
disputes could sour the renewal negotiation, leading to a revenue loss (and
presumably a profit loss as well) to the cable operator.
110. NAT'L Ass'N OF TELECOMMS. OFFICERS & ADVISORS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PRINCIPLES RELATING TO RIGHTS-OF-WAY MANAGEMENT AND COMPENSATION & OWNERSHIP
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES 2, (Aug. 20, 1998), http://www.natoa.org
/documents/LocalGovernmentPrinciplesRelatingtoRights-of-Way.pdf.
111. Id. at3.
112. Id. at 4.
113. FACT SHEET, supra note 100.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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Under the statewide franchise model, the states have differed in the
treatment of the regulatory body. Some states, such as Texas and Indiana,
assign the responsibility to the state utilities regulator. Other states, such
as California, attempt to maintain local enforcement of regulations made at
the state level, but without their prior leverage to cajole cooperation by the
cable company. 1 17 Finally, other states, such as Florida, allowed the state
agencies to assume responsibilities within the cable business, by subject
matter, just as they might for any other business. This model when applied
to Florida led to licensure by the Department of State, consumer complaints
reported to the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, and
unfair trade practice complaints being investigated by the Department of
Legal Affairs.
Each of the noted statewide franchise legislation models suffers from
the incurable reality of shifting the power to license to the state from the
local level. Local city council members likely had political motivations for
putting effort into quickly resolving problems of constituents. However, the
same effort may be less likely when working with a state administrative
agency employee who has no such vested interest in the outcome, personal
relationship with the complaining resident, or personal knowledge of who
locally to call within the offending cable company to request a change in
customer service practice. This failure in service has been the experience in
Floridall9 (state agency by subject matter model) and Indianal20 (the utility
regulatory commission model). Indiana State Representative Matt Pierce
(D-Bloomington) notes that cities "don't have the power to deal with [cable
franchise issues] directly now. You have to go through this bureaucracy in
Indianapolis ... . All the communities look at it and say, 'We don't have
the resources to battle a multinational compan in court [or in an Indiana
Utility Regulatory Commission proceeding].'"
Data is not available to pinpoint where complaints are originating
about issues such as customer service. However, the problem is of primary
concern in areas where the telephone company competitors have not yet
arrived. In these areas, a consumer has lost the protections of the regulated
local monopoly before realizing the benefit of competition. This puts the
116. City Hands Bright House Bill for Cable Franchise Fees, INDIANAPOLIS BuS. J., July
27, 2009, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/govemment/govemment-bodies-offices-
regional/13142357-1.html; COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 57, at 3.
117. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 57, at 6.
118. FLORIDA OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY, supra
note 87, at 3.
119. Id. at 6.
120. City Hands Bright House Billfor Cable Franchise Fees, supra note 116.
121. Id.
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consumer at a disadvantage compared with his fellow citizens who have the
option of shopping their business around to at least four competitors 122
when customer service standards are not met. Given the potential of partial
self-correction through increased competition, this issue is best left
undisturbed until more data is available.
E. Redlining and Build-Out Provisions
In awarding a franchise or franchises, a franchising authority shall
assure that access to cable service is not denied to any group of
potential residential cable subscribers because of th12 ncome of the
residents of the local area in which such group resides.
The politically charged subject of redlining stirs a great deal of
emotion as it speaks to the heart of fair access to information. This
provision of the United States Code effectively countered purely market-
motivated build-out plans until the rise of statewide cable franchising. The
market, if left to its own devices, would likely target wealthy areas first,
where more premium services could be sold, which in all likelihood would
lead to greater profits. The market did not get that chance; instead, local
franchise agreements contained build-out provisions for areas of the
franchise footprint with enough population density to make cable service
economically feasible, which ensured compliance with the United States
Code. A franchise operator could not choose whom to provide service to on
any basis when required to provide service to everyone.
Redlining concerns are not so easily dismissed in an environment
such as statewide cable franchises. However, the concerns are even more
difficult to dismiss when industry fans the flames, just as SBC (now
AT&T) did in the fall of 2004. During a conference call with investors
announcing its new "Lightspeed" service, "SBC said it planned to focus
almost exclusively on affluent neighborhoods."l 24 Project Lightspeed was a
pilot program to roll out fiber-optic broadband in select neighborhoods.
During the conference call, presumably to reassure investors of the
expected return on the investment, SBC "boasted that Lightspeed would be
available to 90% of its 'high-value' customers[,] . . . 70% of its 'medium-
value' customers [,] . . . [and] less than 5% . . . in 'low-value'
neighborhoods."l25 While the statement was incendiary and politically tone
122. The four include the incumbent cable provider, the telephone company video
provider, and the two direct broadcast satellite providers.
123. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (2006).
124. Leslie Cauley, Cable, Phone Companies Duke it out for Customers, USA TODAY,
May 23, 2005, at IB, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/media/2005-05-22-
telco-tv-cover-usat x.htm.
125. Id.
217
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 217 2011-2012
218 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONSLAWJOURNAL [Vol.64
deaf, the policy itself was not against the law. At that time, SBC was not in
the cable business and thus not doing business in opposition to the Cable
Act.126 However, less than a year later, Texas, in the charged environment
created by comments like those of SBC above, would pass its statewide
cable franchising law.127 Soon thereafter, AT&T would become a cable
operator.12 8
The logical start to a discussion about preventing redlining is a
mandatory build-out of all areas, such as what exists at the local level.
However, in a state the size of Texas, such a requirement may not be
economically feasible. A state may be faced with the dilemma of having
imperfect competition or no competition at all. Texas tackled the problem
without using mandatory build-out provisions, but instead put in an
antidiscrimination clause that is very similar to the federal redlining
provision.129 New Jersey took the opposite approach by requiring the full
build-out of the state within six years of receiving a statewide license, thus
avoiding the redlining question entirely.130 Michigan, Virginia, and
California allowed a phased build-out, with both Virginia and California
setting specific percentage goals by certain years to ensure the project
would serve the greatest number of residents in the shortest period of
-131time.
While the New Jersey approach is relatively foolproof to prevent
redlining, the state may be at a size, population density, and development
such that a full build-out can be accomplished. It should be noted that upon
hearing that the build-out provision was in New Jersey's bill, the president
of Verizon at the time stated that it "was 'a barrier to [Verizon's]
entry."'l32 It is unlikely that a state any larger or less dense in population
than New Jersey will see such a provision successfully implemented.
In the absence of a full build-out provision, a state must again
remember its obligations under the United States Code that as "a
franchising authority [it3 shall assure that access to cable service is not
denied" due to income. In order to make such a determination a state
126. While SBC was in a joint marketing agreement at the time with Echostar (now
DISH Network) to provide video service to its customers, that agreement does not have the
effect of making SBC a cable operator. Id.
127. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 57, at 2, 6.
128. Id. at 7, 21.
129. 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws Laws 76 available at http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/
792/billtext/pdfISBOO005F.pdf#navpanes=0.
130. Rushnak, supra note 70, at 60.
131. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 57, at 6.
132. Rushnak, supra note 70, at 60.
133. 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3).
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would have to be provided data, by the carriers themselves, as to where the
statewide licensees were operating down to the household (or at least to the
census block level). However, because the cable companies consider the
information proprietary and a trade secret, they will not release the data for
fear of it being subject to a public records request by a rival cable operator
or potential new entrant to the marketplace. 13 Due to this complication, no
conclusive data is currently available to determine if redlining is occurring.
Florida's Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability ("OPPAGA") was tasked by the legislature at the passage
of the statewide franchise bill to evaluate the build-out and compliance
with the antidiscrimination clause of the law.135 After acknowledging the
issue facing the agency, the OPPAGA recommended that this portion of the
study be scrapped due to lack of data or the legislature adjust the law to
both require companies to provide the data to OPPAGA, while protecting it
from a public records request so the study can be conducted.136 This
legislative adjustment appears to be necessary to head off an accusation of
a state failure to comply with the United States Code in "assuring" no
redlining is taking place.
As opposed to the Texas and Florida approach (no build-out) and the
New Jersey approach (full build-out), the California approach (phased
build-out) appears most realistic for the greatest number of states that still
lack a statewide franchise law. This approach, when reached in cooperation
with the industry that will serve the market, seems most likely to increase
the total number of residents served while giving more direct instruction to
the carriers on how to avoid redlining. California's requirement that both
AT&T and Verizon have no less than twenty-five percent of homes in their
network be low-income, at least facially, puts the onus on the carriers to
ensure compliance. 37
F. Pricing and Broadband Access
The analysis of cable pricing is one fraught with difficulties. The FCC
releases a report on cable pricing annually. However, even this report leads
to contentious debate as to its efficacy. While discussing the 2007 report
before the House Telecommunications and Internet Subcommittee, the
National Cable & Telecommunications Association president called the
134. FLORIDA OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY, supra
note 87, at 7.
135. See id.
136. Id.
137. COMPARATIVE STuDY, supra note 57, at 6.
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report "false and deceptive" while Mary Diamond, a spokeswoman for
the FCC, responded that "[n]o one except the cable industry believes
consumers are paying less for cable than they used to." 139 The cable
industry prefers to use a per channel cost approach, because this may
capture more completely the vast increase in service provided, both in
quantity of channels and quality of delivery (High Definition, Digital, On-
Demand, etc.).140 Conversely, the FCC uses actual cost paid.14 It is not
surprising that these numbers create very different pictures of the industry.
These problems are exacerbated by the difficulties of accounting for
bundled Internet and telephone services.
Some have attempted to overcome these difficulties in the underlying
numbers to make even more assumptions about the specific impact of
statewide franchise laws on pricing. The state of Minnesota commissioned
a study by the University of Minnesota to study the effect of statewide
franchise laws on, among other things, pricing. The March 2009 study
concludes that "there is no one outcome in the data; the presence of
[Statewide Video Franchise] is not necessarily correlated with lower video
service prices."'142 The report speculates that the time horizon may not have
been long enough to get past the capital-intensive build-out of capacity for
real competition to heat up.143 After multiple carriers conduct full build-
outs of their networks the market will benefit from the overcapaci , at
which point we should expect price to be more significantly affected.
The real issue with price appears to be the sense that the public was
misled during the effort to pass the laws. In 2006, bills were being pushed
in many state legislatures and even in Congress on the promise of more
competition creating better pricing and more access. However, information
came out to the contrary, such as an Atlanta Journal-Constitution interview
with AT&T CEO Ed Whitacre, where he said that consumers should
"expect no change" to their monthly bill from AT&T's cable service. 145 In
138. John Eggerton, Eshoo Takes Martin to Task over Cable Policies, BROADCASTING &
CABLE (Feb. 13, 2008, 7:05 AM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/ 12439-
EshooTakes MartintoTaskOverCablePolicies.php.
139. John Eggerton, FCC Responds to Criticism of Cable-Price Data, BROADCASTING &
CABLE (Feb. 15, 2008, 12:18 PM), http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/112478-
FCC RespondstoCriticismof CablePriceData.php.
140. William Triplett, NCTA challenges FCC report, Variety (Jan. 4, 2007),
http://www.variety.com/articie/VRI1117956720?refCatld=18.
141. Id.
142. COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 57, at 16.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Q&A with AT&T CEO Ed Whitacre: 'Nothing's moved', ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTrruTION, Feb. 13, 2007, at Cl, available at http://www.redorbit.com/news/
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June 2006, Representatives John Dingelll46 and Edward Markeyl47 wrote a
letter to the House Energy and Commerce Committee suggesting, without
citation, that AT&T's CFO reportedly said that their services "probab1y
will be priced somewhat higher than the average cable TV subscription."'
The letter did not spare Verizon either; their Director of Federal Public
Affairs, Thomas Maguire, was quoted saying that Verizon cable service
will be priced "competitively, but not a discount."l49 To be certain, neither
Verizon, nor AT&T hoped to compete on price until such time as they had
recovered some of the significant capital investment required to build out
the service footprint.
While price is inconclusive at this stage, the same does not have to be
said for the additional broadband connections attributable to the statewide
franchise laws. Ball State University's Digital Policy Institute released a
study in early 2010 showing over five million new broadband connections
that were directly attributable to the statewide franchise laws.150 For most
of the twenty-two states studied (Texas was notably absent), the increase in
subscribers was between 1.5% and 2.5%.151 However, Vermont and Rhode
Island, perhaps due to size and population concentration managed increases
of more than five percent.152
The data taken as a whole, suggests that frustration over pricing or
broadband access by the state franchise authorities may be significant;
however, it is best met with patience as the marketplace matures. Until
overcapacity is reached and full competition on price is unleashed,
regulators should expect stability in cable pricing while operators seek to
recover a portion of the significant capital investment necessary to build-
out twenty-five states simultaneously. The initial data on increased
broadband access bodes well for those that make the argument that the state
franchise system is part of the solution to bridging the digital divide.
technology/841058/qawith_att ceoedwhitacre/index.html.
146. Ranking Member, House Committee on Energy and Commerce (D-Michigan).
147. Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet
(D-Massachusetts).
148. JoHN DINGELL & EDWARD MARKEY, OPEN LETTER To HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, DON'T LEAVE CONSUMERS HAVING TO COPE WITH WORSE CABLE
SERVICE, June 5, 2006, http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/Press 109/109dc25.
pdf.
149. Id. at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Cecil Bohanon & Michael Hicks, Statewide Cable Franchising and Broadband
Connections, DIGITAL POLICY INSTITUTE BALL STATE UNIVERSITY 9 (2010).
151. Id.
152. Id.
221
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 221 2011-2012
222 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL [Vol.64
V. CONCLUSION & SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Statewide cable franchise laws should be strongly considered for the
states that have resisted such a change until this point. While no state has
managed to combine all of the elements recommended in the course of this
analysis, the options available have been largely explored and results are
available for consideration by future decision makers. At the outset, a
prospective statewide franchise law would benefit from cooperation with
the major carriers that might enter the market. The best laws are those that
encourage the investment in the state from as many carriers as possible via
a phased build-out model based on the underlying technology to be used
(California approach). This approach can balance the state desire to protect
against redlining, while also making the investment of capital attractive to
the prospective carrier entrant.
For those states that are able to overcome local municipal association
opposition, franchise and PEG channel fees should be eliminated to
encourage transparency in tax policy and ensure that only those
communities who value PEG channels will be forced to pay for them
(Florida approach). PEG channels should, however, receive protection in
the form of matching carriage rules. Local government, while losing
franchise fee income, should receive explicit reinforcement of their right to
manage public rights-of-way, including reasonable fees and
nondiscriminatory practices for usage of the public property. The
regulatory body will be largely determined by the existing governmental
structure of a given state; however, thought should be given to managing
the transition from local monopoly to statewide franchise competition with
a specific agency responsible for all complaints. However, a state might
consider a sunset clause on such a law, as the need for such a resource
outlay should naturally subside as the market matures and competition
better enforces customer service standards. All such laws should include at
least an adoption of the FCC minimum guidelines for customer service and
a mechanism for complaint and enforcement to protect constituents from
egregious behavior by cable operators. 153
Finally, the public should be informed that these laws are not a cure-
all that will instantly provide lower prices and more access to broadband.
There are positive effects to be gained in the short run in the form of job
creation for the build-out process and some new broadband connectivity.
However, the long-term implications may be far more significant as pricing
becomes competitive and increased broadband access lessens the digital
divide.
153. FACT SHEET, supra note 100.
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